Do Banks Provide “Price-Supporting” or “Loan-Supporting” in Financial Distressed Companies? Evidence from Taiwan

[[abstract]]本文採用事件研究法探討有本國銀行擔任財務危機公司董事、監事或大股東，是否提供價格支撐或債權支撐效果？實證結果發現擔任財務危機公司董事或大股東之銀行持股比率與超額周轉率均呈現上升的型態，而且有銀行擔任董事、監事或大股東之財務危機公司的累積超額報酬率均顯著高於沒有銀行擔任董事、監事或大股東之財 務危機公司的累積超額報酬率，顯示銀行藉由買進持股以穩定股價，因此具有價格支撐效果。再者，銀行對財務危機公司提供的價格支撐效果隨著銀行擔任董事、大股東和監事的身份而遞減。此外，研究發現於財務危機宣告日後，有銀行擔任財務危機公司董事或大股東之新成立的借貸契約條款有較寬鬆的現象，與債權支撐效果假說一致。然而，因銀行受到潛在利益衝突影響，故有銀行擔任財務危機公司董事、監事或大股東之新成立借貸契約條款劣於沒有銀行擔任財務危機公司董事、監事或大股東之新成立借貸契約條款。[[abstract]]This study investigates whether banks being directors, supervisors, or blockholders in financial distressed companies provide price-supporting or loan-supporting effects. We find that after the financial distressed announcement, banks’ shareholdings, excess turnover ratios, and cumulative abnormal returns increase for those financial distressed companies with banks being directors, supervisors, or blockholders. This evidence is consistent with the price-supporting effect. Furthermore, the magnitude of price-supporting effect is strongest when banks are also directors while the magnitude is weakest when banks are also blockholders. Besides, consistent with the loan-supporting effect, the loan terms become more favorable after the event date. However, the loan terms for financial distressed companies with banks being directors, supervisors, or blockholders are more adverse than those without banks being directors, supervisor, or blockholders.[[note]]碩